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Executive summary
A - DEBT OVERHANG
The  role  of  debt  forgiveness is  to  alleviate what  is  known as  the
"debt  overhang".  This  was  the core  idea  of  Brady deals,  and  now comes
to the center of the African debt crisis.
How can one specifically gauge the  "debt overhang" hypothesis?  What
is  the  extent  to  which  one  can  an  attribute to  the  debt crisis  of  the
1980s a significant role in the growth slowdown of the  1990s'?  We carry
such  an  exercice  in  this  text.  Using  data  that  now encompasses the
whole  of  the  past  decade,  we  do  find  a  significant role  for  debt
variables. Under one  exercice, we  find  that more than half the growth
slowdown of  the  large  debtors in  the  1980s could be  attributed to  the
debt crisis.
B - DEBT  THRESHOLD
What  could  be  a  "reasonnable" debt  ratio  to  which  African  debt
should  be  written  down  ?  Most  exercices  set  the  threshold  of
sustainability  of  the  debt  at  about  200  %.  The  easiest  way  to
rationalize such  a  threshold  is  first  to  measure the  average value of
debt-to-export  ratios  that  were  reached  at  the  time  of  the  first
rescheduling of  any  given  country.  When  taking  Latin  America as  a
benchmark, one finds an average threshold of 248 %. However "myopic"
such a  ratio  might be,  it  goes long way towards rationalizing the  view
that  a  debt-to-export ratio  "between 200%  and  300%",  is  a  strong
signal of a forthcoming crisis.
This  naive  approach takes  no  account of  the  changing environment
(regarding  growth  and  interest  rates)  to  which  a  country  can  be
confronted. A  more  subtle approach should take explicit account of  the
prospect  of  growth  of  one  country  in  order  to  assess  the
2sustainability of  the  debt  it  inherits.  In  order  to  incorporate these
dynamics, one  can  proceed with the  following exercice. Taking Mexico
as  a  benchmark.  one  gets  the  following results.  At  the  worst  of  its
debt crisis, Mexico transferred abroad 4.7%  of  its GDP. Taking account
of  growth  and  interest  rate,  one  can  calculate that  it  should  have
service  7%  of  it  GDP  to  stabilize its  debt-to-GDP ratio.  This  points
to  the  view  that  its  debt  was  one  third  too  large.  In  debt-to-export
terms,  that  points  to  the  view  that  a  debt-to-export worth  220%  in
1985  would  have  avoided  the  crisis.  Applying  this  methodology to
African  countries,  we  get  that  African  debt  proportionately, debt-to-
export ratio  should be  brought to  the 200% mark (more specifically to
198%).
C  - MARKET  VALUE OF  THE  DEBT
Another way  to  assess  the  sustainability of  the  debt  is  to  take  a
direct view to the secondary market.
Secondary market allows to  estimate the  prospect of  repayment that
are  expected by  market  participants.  Few  African  debts  are  actually
quoted  on  secondary markets  but  one  can  reconstruct by  econometric
methods  what  is  the  price  at  which the  debt  would be  valued,  if  it
were quoted on  grounds similar to  other indebted countries. We perform
such  an  exercice,  and  we  reach  the  following conclusion. In  average,
African debt  would be  worth 42  cents on  the  dollar if  it  were priced
on  secondary market.  (Interestingly, our  estimate of  Ivory  Coast  and
Nigeria  two  African countries whose debt  is  actually priced,  are  very
similar  to  their  actual  price).  One  can  then  proceed  to  carry  the
following exercice:  if  the  debt  were  to  be  written  down to  the  level
that  would  bring  its  price  to  a  25 %  discount,  what  should  be  the
corresponding debt-to-export ratio? The  answer is:  210%,  which -again-
suggests that a threshold  between 200 and 250% is about right.
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INTRODUCTION
Many large debtors of  the  1980s such as Argentina, Brazil or Mexico
have  found  their  way  out  of  the  sequence  of  painful  reschedulings
which marred for almost a decade their economic prospects.
Such is  not  the  case of  African countries. Debt remains large, and
no  far  reaching agreement has yet  been found that could open the  way
to a brighter future.
In  this  paper  we  try  to  set  the  foundations of  the  analysis of  the
African  debt  crisis  by  reviewing  two  problems.  First  what  is  the
extent  to  which  one  can  attribute to  the  debt crisis  of  the  1980s the
growth slowdown of  the  large debtors ?  Second, we try  to  address the
question  of  defining  the  appropriate  level  of  debt-to-export  ratio
upon which a programme of debt forgiveness  could be targetted.
Regarding the  first  question  (which  we  analyze in  section  1),  we
find  that  the  debt  crisis  can  explain  more  than  half  the  growth
slowdown of  large  debtors  in  the  1990s. The  other  half  is  essentially
due  to  the  terms  of  trade  fluctuations. The  effect  is  especially large
in  Latin  American  but  nonetheless critical  in  African  countries  as
well.
Turning  to  the  analysis  of  what  could  be  an  appropriate debt-to-
export target,  we  offer three  potential measures. The  most naive ratio
simply  measures the  average  debt-to-export ratios  of  countries  which
rescheduled their  debt  for  the  first  time.  Taking  Latin  America as  a
benchmark,  we  get  that  the  critical  debt-to-export ratio  is  250%  We
then  calculated  which  debt-to-export  ratio  was  likely  to  be
4sustainable  (by  which  is  meant  not  increasing)  when  the  service
capability of  debtor countries is assumed to  mimick Latin America. One
gets a  debt-to-export threshold below 200%  . (This is shown in  section
2).
Finally,  we  investigated what  could  be  a  debt-to-export ratio  that
would  allow  the  debt  of  African debt  to  be  quoted  on  a  secondary
market at a  discount not exceeding 25%.  We  find a debt-to-export ratio
of 210%. (This is shown in section 3).
Altogether, our  analysis then  suggests that  debt  matters and  that  a
debt-to-export ratio in  between 200  and 250%  is  a  reasonable target to
alleviate the crisis.
51. The debt overhang
We  first  want  to  assess  the  correlation between debt  and  growth
that  was  observed  in  the  1980s. We  shall  first  investigate the  extent
to  which  the  debt  build  up  of  the  early  eighties can  be  identified as
an  important cause of  the slow down of  growth during the past decade.
We  shall  then  attempt to  draw  more  broadly  the  lessons of  the  debt
crisis  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  one  should  expect  (in  the
future?)  foreign  finance  to  speed  up  growth  in  the  poor  countries.
This  will  open  the  way  to  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  potential
efficiency gains that a debt write-off could deliver.
1 - A  "Ouasi Accounting" framework
We  shall set up.  here,  a  "quasi-accounting"  framework which builds
on  the  "augmented" Solow model analyzed in Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1990) (henceforth MRW) . Assume that production can be written as
(1)  Qt  =  Kat HP(A L )7,
Kt  is  physical capital,  Ht  is  "human" capital,  Lt  is  raw  labor,  At  is
an exogeneous  productivity  term, and a  +  f  +  I  =  1.  Call It and Zt the
investments  in physical and human capital respectively. One can write:
Kt =  d K  t+  It  (2-a)
(2) - (
Ht  =  d  H  t+  Z t  (2-b)
Call,  Yt  =  (Qt/Lt)  output  per  capita,  at=Log  At,  Yt =  Log  Yt.0ne
can log-linearize  (1) and (2) as:
A  ~~~~~~~~~A
(3)  d  Yt =  at +  (1-a-9) (d  +  n +  /A) [yt-  yt]
A
in which, yt is
6A ~~~xI  t  3Zt 
(4)  yt  = a  +  T  Log  - +  Log ot-  --- 1 Log (d+n+p)
In  MRW,  Yt is  taken as  a  proxy of  the  (Log of  the)  income per
capita  steady-state towards which the  economy is  converging. There  is
no ground to  make such an hypothesis since  y and  can very well vary
with  the  level  of  income.  Equation  (3)  is  simply  obtained  by
differentiating  (1)  (around  its  initial  value)  while  taking  account  of
(2)  to  measure  the  increase  of  capital.  It  nevertheless remains  the
case  that  one  can  interpret  equations  (3)  and  (4)  as  a  "quasi-
accounting" framework. It  is  on  such  an  interpretation that we  shall
draw  in  order to  decompose the  origin  of  the growth slowdown in  the
eighties.
2 - A benchmark  equation
In  this  section,  we  first  offer  to  estimate  equation  (3).  To  the
extent  that  we  want  to  pay  a  specific  attention to  the  shift  of  the
pattern of  growth over  the years,  we shall pool the time  averages over
the  following four  sub-samples:  1973-77; 78-82 ;  83-87 ;  88-92.  We
use the Summer-Heston  data (1991) and complement  them with World Bank
data.  Zt/Qt is  proxied by  secondary school enrollment. (In Cohen 1991,
I show that MRW's procedure essentially amounts to that).
The  results  are  shown  in  Equation (5),  in  which  one  should read:
Lpop  =  Log (d+n+,),  Ls2 =  Log  (Z/Q),  Linv  =  Log (sl),  Lyinit  =  Log
(yo),  Tot  =  terms of  trade variations, Resch is  a dummy which counts
the  number of  reschedulings that  a  country went through, D2  =  time
dummy 1978-82, D3  =  1983-87, D4  =  1988-92, Africa is a dummy for
Africa, LAAM is a dummy for Latin America, and Ldet the Log of  the
debt to GDP ratio at the beginning of 1983 and 1988. One obtains:
(5)  g  =  -0.11  - 0.025  Lpop  +  0.0036  Ls2 +  0.032  Linv  +  0.0088  ToT
(-2.9)  (-2.0)  (1.3)  (6.0)  (2.1)
-0.057  Ldet - 0.02  Resch - 0.086  Ln(Yinitial) - 0.008  d2
(-2.5)  (-2.9)  (-3.6)  (-1.8)
7-0.0051  d3  +  0.0025  d4  - 0.017  Africa - 0.007  Laam
(-0.95)  (0.44)  (-2.1)  (-1.5)
R2=  0.37
The  main  result  which  appears  from  this  regression is  the  very
significant role  of  the  debt  crisis.  Both the  debt  and  the  number of
reschedulings  are  significant  variables  (and  dropping  one  would
reinforce the  explanatory power of  the  other).  A  key  feature  of  this
regression  is  that  it  explains  the  growth  slowdown of  the  eighties
remarkably well: as one sees, the time dummies are not significant.
There  is  clearly  a  key  problem  in  interpreting this  regression in
causal terms.  It  can very well be the case that the slowdown of  growth
(for  whichever  reason)  caused  the  country's  debt  problems.
Furthermore,  it  can  also  be  the  case  that  the  effect  of  the  debt
crisis  is  quite  different  on  middle-income debtors  and  low-income
countries.  One  can  respond  to  these  questions  as  follows.  For  one
thing,  the  debt  variable  itself  is  a  beginning-of-period variable,  so
it  is  immune,  to  some  extent,  the  risk  of  reverse  causality.
Furthermore,  when  attempting to  differentiate the  African  debt  from
other  countries'  debts,  (by  interacting  the  debt  variable  with  an
African  dummy)  one  does  not  find  a  statistically  significant
difference emerging.  One  can  also  point  to  the  fact  that  we  control
for  the  main  alternative factor that could cause  the  growth slowdown,
namely  the  terms  of  trade,  which  indeed turns  out  to  be  significant
although not outstandingly.
It  is  also  crucial  to  note  that  this  growth  equation  is  obtained
through  "conditional dynamics"  that  take  account  of  the  investment
decision.  It  is  therefore  not  the  shift  of  investment which  explains
the  slowdown  of  growth  that  we  are  identifying  but  a  loss  of
"productivity" (which obviously must take  account of  the  fact  that the
recession of  the  early  eighties has  pushed the  economies within their
production possibility frontiers).  One  then  wants  to  get  an  additional
equation that  explains the  slow down of  investment itself. In  order  to
get  a  measure of  this  factor,  we  have  then  estimated an  investment
8equation which  is  conditionned on  the  same  variables as  the  growth
equation and a term OPEN which measures  the degree of openness (export
+  import  ratios)  of  the  country.  The  results  are  shown  in  equation
(6).
(6)  Linv  =  -2.47  +  0.02  Ls2 +  0.055  Lyinit  +  0.53  Open  +  0.13  ToT
(1.5)  (0.7)  (2.3)  (5.1)  (2.7)
-0.030  Resch  +  0.06  d2 - 0.06  d3 - 0.005  d4  - 0.24  Africa




We are  now in  a  position to  analyze the  causes of  the growth slow
down  in  African countries.  The aggregate results are  reported in  table
1,  in  which the  comparison to  Latin America is  also reported. Country
specific data are reported in table Al  in appendix.
Worldwide recession Structural shift Role of Investment
Africa  - 0.27  +  0.19  - 0.23
Latin America  - 0.27  +  0.35  - 0.35
Debt crisis Terms of trade Residual Total  gr owth
Slowdown
Africa  - 0.50  - 0.54  +  0.35  - 1.01
Latin America  - 1.18  - 0.05  - 0.13  - 1.54
TABLE 1: CAUSES OF GROWTH SLOWDOWN
9We  compare  the  second  half of  the  eighties to  the  second half  of
the  seventies (for  simplicity the  eighties and  the  seventies). We  find
that  African  (average  yearly)  growth  lost  about  1%  in  the  eighties
compared to  the  seventies. Our model predicts a  reduction of  1.3%,  so
that  one  can  interpret  the  unexplained  residual  as  a  better  than
predicted total  factor  productivity performance. The  explained growth
slow down comes as  follow: about one third (0.54) is explained by the
debt  crisis,  one  third  by  the  tenns  of  trade,  investment  explains
about  a  forth,  and  the  remainder comes for  the  interaction of  world
recession  (-0.27%)  and  domestic  structural  variables,  school
enrollements  and  fertility  (+0.19%).  This  picture  can  be  readily
contrasted to  Latin  America,  which  suffered little  aggregate terms  of
trade troubles, but a much more severe debt crisis.
Turning  then  to  investment, one  sees  that  it  fell  by  about  21%,
which is  fairly well explained by  our  model. The origin of  the  fall is
first  and  foremost a  worlwide phenomenon (-12%), with  terms of  trade
and  the  debt  crisis  explaining the  remainder. Here  one  sees  that  the
debt  crisis  is  a  more  powerful explanation (-7%)  than  the  terms  of
trade (-3%).
102.  DEBT SUSTAINABILITY AND GROWTH
I - THE  SOLVENCY OF  A GROWING  ECONOMY
Let  us  first  try  a  direct  exercice.  Take  the  case  of  a  growing
economy which inherits a  stock of  debt that  it has  to  service over  an
infinite  future.  Assume  that  the  economy  is  in  a  stationary
environment  (ie,  neglect  the  fluctuations  of  terms  of  trade  and
growth).  How  can  one  calculate the  level of  sustainable debt,  ie  the
level  of  debt  that  is  consistent  with  the  pattern  of  growth  of  the
country?
One  first  easy  test  is  to  calculate the  fraction b  of  the  country's
ressources  that  have  to  be  allocated  to  the  service  of  the  debt  in
order to  stabilize the country's debt-to-GDP. Call D/Q  the debt to  GDP
ratio,  r  the  interest rate  and  n  the  country's  growth  rate.  One  can
then simply write:
b  =  (r-n)  QT  (5)
t
Were  the  country willing to  service more than  b,  then  the  debt-to-
GDP  ratio would fall.  But if the country was not willing to  pay such a
ratio,  then  for  sure,  the  debt-to-GDP ratio  would  rise  indefinitely
and the debt would sooner of later become unsustainable. How should we
think  of  the  highest possible b  that  a  country  should be  willing  to
service ? In appendix, I summarize a model (developped in Cohen, 1994)
in  which  the  upper  value  of  b  is  simply  the  cost  A  of  debt
repudiation,  i.e.  the  fraction  of  a  country's  ressources that  would  be
foregone were  it  had  to  go  at  war  with  its  creditors. A  is  a  number
which  is  fairly  theoretical.  Yet,  one  can  infer  its  value  by  the
observed behavior of  countries which  have been pushed to  the  "limit"
by  their  creditors.  If  I  observed  that  debtors  countries  will  never
repay more  than -say- 5%  of their output when they get constrained to
service then debt,  I  can  draw  indirectly the  upper bound to  the  debt-
11to-output ratio.
Before  getting  more  specifically  into  such  calculations, one  must
give a  few words of  caution over the meaning of such exercices for the
African  countries.  For  one  thing  African  countries  are  not  yet
constrained  :  they  keep  receiving inflows  from  the  rich  countries:
there  is  consequently no  reason  for  them  to  even  think  of  debt
repudiation.  The  question  that  our  exercice  addresses  is  the
following:  what  is  the  level  of  debt  that  they  would  rather  service
than  repudiate when  (if)  the  time  comes for  the  creditor  to  get  re-
imbursed.  If  the  creditors  keep  granting  subsidies to  these  countries,
then  the  debt  will  never  be  repudiated, but  then,  clearly,  it  is  not
a  debt  either  :  it  is  simply  a  fictitious  accounting  device  for
grants.  Addressing  the  issue  of  debt  sustainability in  the  African
context should perhaps simply be  interpreted as  an  attempt to  draw  a
line  between market debt  and  grants  in  which the  latter  include both
the  explicit  grant  element  of  loans,  and  the  implicit  (forthcoming)
debt write-off of that part of the debt which is not sustainable.
The  second  warning about  Africa  is  about  the  use  of  the  interest
rate  that  should  be  used  when  writing  equation  (5)  and  about  the
definition  of  the  debt.  First  the  debt  must  clearly  be  corrected  for
the  grant  element that  is  encompassed in  the  low  interest rate  that  it
usually charged.  But,  second,  it  should  also  be  clear  that  one  wants
to  use  the  market  rate  of  interest as  a  discount factor  and  not  the
concessional rate  that  these  countries have  usually  access to.  Indeed,
to  repeat,  the  exercice that  we carry  on  is  one  in  which we want to
separate the  debt  stricto  sensu  from  the  flow  of  aid  that  a  country
receives.
Empirical implications
One  can  first  try  to  see,  on  historical grounds,  the  critical  level
of  debt-to-GDP  ratios  at  which  the  countries  started  to  reschedule
their  debt. This  is  shown in  Table 5.  One sees that,  in  Latin America,
the  debt  crisis  was  started  at  a  level  of  debt-to-export of  250%.
Ceteris paribus,  one  can  then  say that  a  debt-to-export ratio  of  250%
becomes unsustainable.
12Besides this  naive definition.  one  can  go  further and  calculate the
values of  b  (as  defined  in  equation (5))  corresponding to  the  debt  of
African and  Latin American debtors. This  is done in  tables A2 and A3.
In  Latin America the  average value of  b  is around 8%  . In Africa, the
values of  b  are  not much different in average, at about 8-9%, but wide
differences between  Cote  d'Ivoire  at  16%  and  Botswana at  1%  are
noteworthy.
As a  measure of what a  country "could" pay (ie as a measure of the
revealed cost  of  debt  repudiation, if  one  wants) one  can  observe what
the  Latin  American  countries  did  actually  transfer  in  net  terms  to
their  creditors during  the  eighties.  These  numbers are  shown  in  table
4.  Taking Mexico as  the  "median" debtor, one  finds that  net  transfers
never  exceeded 5.5%  (in  1986), and  averaged 4.7%  during  the  tense
episode  of  1984-89.  Taking  the  period  1985-88 as  a  reference,  this
indicates (in  the  most  favorable interpretation) that  Mexican debt  was
one  third  too  high.  This  implies  that  a  debt-to-export ratio  worth
220%  would  have  been  sustainable in  1985.  Clearly,  this  is  a  very
partial  story,  but  it  has  the  merit  of  an  easy  interpretation. Under
the  toughest circumstances, Mexico transferred no  more  than 4.7%  of
its  ressources  to  its  external  creditors.  This  4.7 %  number  can
therefore  be  taken as  a  benchmark of  what  a  "typical"  large  debtor
would rather pay than defaulting on its debt.
Let  us  then  apply  this  4.7%  benchmark to  Africa.  Regarding the
African SILICs,  (Severely Indebted Low  Income Debtors) one  finds an
average value of  b  of  12.8%. Assuming that they would never transfer
more  than  4.7%  of  their  ressources abroad,  this  points  to  the  view
that  debt  is  too -high by  a  factor  of  2.7.  Applying this  ratio  to  the
debt-to-export of  SILICs,  one  finds  that  the  debt  to  export should be
scaled down  to  about  200%  (198%  to  be  accurate) to  meet  Mexican
standard of sustainability.
133. The secondary market price of African debt
The  approach above  is  clearly too  naive inasmuch as  it  assumes
that  countries  have  reached  a  stationary  environment and  takes  no
account of  other  characteristics such  as  varying degrees of  openness,
uncertainty and the forth.
One  more  direct  way  to  look  at  the  issue  could  be  to  extract
from  secondary  markets  the  information  regarding  these  various
influences such  as  prospect  of  growth,  openness,...  on  the  value  of
the debt. However, most African debt is held by government  or IFIs and
is  consequently  not  quoted  on  secondary  market.  It  is  then  not
possible to  draw  from  the  markets a  direct evaluation of  the  price  of
African debt.  Drawing upon an  econometric analysis of  the  debt which
is  actually quoted  on  these  markets,  one  can  nevertheless attempt  to
reconstruct what  price  the  market  would assign to  African debt  if  it
were to be quoted. Furthermore, drawing on  the key distinction between
average and  marginal growth that  has been  emphasized by  Bulow and
Rogoff,  one  can  estimate  how  much  resources  would  actually  be
surrendered by  the  holders of  African debt,  if  it  were to  be,  say, cut
by  half.  As  we  shall  see,  this  latter  exercice yields quasi  negligible
number.  From  the  rich  countries'  tax  payer  money,  a  substantial
reduction of African debt would not be much a loss.
Most  of  African  debt  is  held  by  government  or  IFIs  and  is
consequently not  quoted on  secondary market.  It  is  then  not  possible
to  draw  from  the  markets a  direct evaluation of  the  price  of  African
debt.  Drawing  upon  an  econometric analysis  of  the  debt  which  is
actually  quoted  on  these  markets,  one  can  nevertheless attempt to
reconstruct what price  the  market  would  assign to  African debt  if  it
were to be quoted. Such is the goal of the present section.
I  - A THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND
To  set  up  the  ideas  in  an  explicit  model,  consider a  simple two
periods model of a country which owes a debt at time t=2.  Assume that
the  country  always  has  the  option  to  repudiate  its  debt  and  also
14assume  that  the  banks  can  (credibly)  impose  - in  retaliation-  a
sanction that  amounts  to  a  fraction  A  Q  of  the  country's  income.
Finally,  assume that  the  banks can  always get  the country to  pay  that
fraction A  Q  that the  country would forego by  defaulting. Call  dF(Q)
the  density of  the  (random) distribution of  the  country's  income. Let
us  take  the  banks to  be  risk-neutral and  (for  simplicity of  notations)
take  the  riskless rate to  be  nil.  One  can  write the  market  value of  a
debt whose contractual value is D to be:
V(D)  =  [  D  x Q dF(Q) +  I  D  . dF(Q)]
0  DIA
The first term in  the bracket represents how much the banks can get
when the income of  the country is so  low that the country would rather
default  than  servicing  the  debt  fully  (A  Qs  D).  The  second  term
measures the  expected payments  that  accrue  to  the  banks  when  the
country honors the contractual value of  the debt (an  event which as  a
probability  1-F(D/A)). (This  model  and  its  extensions are  exposed at
greater  length in  Cohen  1991;  see  also  Eaton,  Gersovitz and  Stiglitz,
1986.)
The  market  price  of  the  debt  (such as  observed on  the  secondary
market) can simply be written as:
q(D) =  ID/  Q  dF(Q) +  1-F (D/A)]
If  a  country were,  say,  to  repurchase one dollar of  its  debt on  the
secondary market,  this  is  the  price  that  it  would  have  to  pay.  If
instead the country wants to  repurchase an amount B and is known to be
willing to  do  so,  then -as  Dooley  (1989) first  pointed out- the  price
at  which  the  transaction will  be  undertaken can  only  be  the  ex-post
equilibrium  price.  (Otherwise,  no  lenders  will  actually  sell  its
claim). One then gets that the price for the transaction  has to be
q(D-B) =[  J(D-B)/|  dF(Q) +  1-F [(D-B)/A)]
0
15Obviously,  if  a  debtor  country  is  known  to  be  willing  to  repurchase
all  of  its  debt  (B=D)  then  the  only  price  at  which  the  transaction
will be  undertaken  is q=1.
This  crucial  remark  makes  it  very  undesirable  to  set  up,  say,  an
institution  -endowed  with  a  given  amount of  money- which  would operate
openly  to  repurchase  LDC  debt.  Such  an  institution would  immediately
raise the price  and defeat  its own purpose.
The  point  which  is  made  by  Bulow  and  Rogoff (1991)  radicalizes  this
critique.  Assume  that  the  country  (or  an  institution  acting  on  its
behalf)  repurchases  a  small  fraction  of  the  debt  so  that,  say,  the
measure  the  benefit  that  is  captured  by  the  country.  For  the  country,
what  matters  is the reduction of the market  value of  the debt,  i.e
p(D) _ V'(D)  =  1-F(D/X)
which  is  strictly  (perhaps  much)  lower  than  q(D).  So  even  if  the
country  was  repurchasing  a  fraction  B  of  its  debt  one  dollar  after  the
other,  repeatedly  taking  the  creditors  by  "surprise"  (i.e  they  never
expect  that  the  next  dollar  will  be  repurchased,  but  they  always  know
-at  each  point  in  time-  what  is  the  exact  stock  of  debt),  it  would
still be  over  paying its debt since it would pay
p  =  fD  q(D)  dD
D-B
which  is strictly  more  expensive that
D
AV =  V(D)  - V(D-B)  =  p(D) dD
D-B
Bulow  and  Rogoff  concluded  that  this  wedge  between  the  cost  of  a
debt  buy-back  and  its  real  effect  on  the  market  value  of  the  debt
makes  it  unlikely  to  turn  buybacks  into  a  profitable  investment.  Does
this  reasoning  apply  to  the  debt  crisis  of  the  30s  and  lead  to
interpret  the  large  buy-backs  which  were  then  performed  as  an  unworthy
investment?  Not  necessarily.  As  we  pointed  out  in  Cohen  and  Verdier
(1995)  a  buy-back  can  be  good  if  it  is  done  secretly.  If  -say-  Morgan
16repuchases  Brazil's  debt  -held  by  Citicorp-  on  Brazil's  behalf  without
revealing  for  whom  the  purchase  is  made,  there  are  no  limits  to  the
extent  of  the  repurchases  which  can  be  made  by  Morgan  at  the  given
price.  (It  is  only  when  Brazil's  actions  are  discovered  that  the  price
rises  since  only  in  that  case  the  reduction  of  its  outstanding
external  debt  raises  the  price.)  Obviously,  in  the  thirties,  the  Latin
American  buy-backs were  only  revealed after they were  completed.
Yet,  as  far  as  the  open  buy-backs  such  as  those  that  the  Brady  deal
encourages,  it  is  obviously  crucial  to  make  sure  that  the  price  at
which  the  buy-back  is  undertaken  is  appropriately  priced.  This
involves  a  comprehensive  ex  ante  agreement  with  the  creditors,  so  that
none  of  them  can  free-ride  on  the  others.  This  is  exactly  what  the
Brady  deal  has  done.  In  a  process  called  "novation",  it  was  agreed
that  all  the  previous  debt  had  to  be  exchanged  against  one  of  the
three  options  which  were  open.  (On  this  point,  see  Diwan  and  Kletzer,
1990, and Demirguc-Kunt  and Fernandez-Arias,  1992).
In  order  to  evaluate  empirically  how  the  Brady  deal  has  worked  I
will  first  analyze  how  the  distinction  between  average  and  marginal
price  can be  reconstructed empirically.
2  - Econometric  estimates
Previous  econometric  estimates  of  the  secondary  market  involve,
Fernandez  and  Ozler  (1991),  Huizinga  and  Ozler(1992)  or  Cohen  and
Portes  (1990).  I  will  rely  here  on  the  price  of  20  middle  income
countries  for  which  the  transactions  are  relatively  frequent.  (Cf.
Financial  Flows  to  Developing  Countries,  Dec.91).  The  data  are  pooled
over  the years  1987. 89,  90,  91,  92 and  93.
To  the  extent  that  we  are  interested  in  distinguishing  the  average
and  the  marginal  price  of  the  debt,  we  want  to  estimate  a  price
equation  which  yield  explicitly  such  a  distinction.  Following  my
earlier  work  (Cohen,  1992)  I  will  use  a  logistic  function  of  the
prices  to account for  this discrepancy.  Specifically,  I  estimate z:
17z  =  Log Tq_
as  a  function  of  the  degree  of  openness  (OPEN),  the  log  of  total  debt
(LDET2),  the  number of  reschedulings  since  1985 (RES85),  the  terms  of
trade  (TOT),  the  predicted  value  of  growht  (G2)  such  as  arising  from
equation  (1)  and  a  dummy  for  Peru  (PER),  Poland  (POL)  and  Bulgaria
(BUL).  The results are shown  in equation  (3).
LPFIN  =  3.032  +  4.95  OPEN  - 1.44 LDET2  - 0.357  RES85  +  1.55 TOT
(1.07)  (2.76)  (-4.30)  (-2.80)  (1.37)
+  40.13  G2 - 2.65  PER - 1.52  POL - 5.63  BUL - 2,53  D2
(2.47)  (-4.37)  (-3.08)  (-5.53)  (-2.29)
- 2.73  D3 - 2.34  D4 - 1.11 D5  - 0.99  D6
(-2.60)  (-2.35)  (-1.14)  (-1.03)
R2  =  0.674
One  finds  a  fairly  well  explained  price  behavior,  which  reveals  an
elasticity  of  z  to  debt  of  1.44  which  can  be  transformed,  by
differentiating  both sides,  into:
dq  =  1.44(1-q)  dD
q  -
Call  V  =  qD the market  value of debt,  one gets
(8)  d  =  [1 - 1.44  (1-q)]  dD
There  is  consequently  a  threshold  price  for  which  the  elasticity  of
price  with  respect  to  debt  is  (in  absolute  value)  smaller  than  one.
The price,  here,  is
q*  =  0.31  cents.
18In  part  coincidently,  this  price  is  not  significantly  different
from  the  average  price  (=0.35)  of  the  representative  middle  income
debtor  at the end  of  1989.
One can also rewrite  equation (8)  as:
dV  =  1.44  [q-q*]  dD
or  equivalently,  we can write that the marginal price  is
p  =  1.44  (q-q*) q.
Below  that  price  q*  there  is  a  case  of  "debt  Laffer  curve"  as
Krugman  (1988)  puts  it.  Reducing  the  face  value  of  the  debt  may  raise
its  market  value.  As  I  emphasized  in  my  earlier  paper,  however,  there
are  only  very  few  countries  for  which  -with  95  %  confidence-  this
mechanism  is bound  to  appear.  Around  that  threshold point,  however,  we
can  take  the  marginal  price  of  the  debt  to  be  nil.  Lenders,  as  a
whole,  are  essentially  indifferent  between  one  more  or  one  less  dollar
on  their  books.  For  countries  which  would  repurchase  their  debt  to  the
left  of  the  price  q*,  the  deal  would  offer  the  bankers  a  "boondogle",
as  Bulow  and  Rogoff  have  put  it  for  the  Bolivian  buy-back  which
occurred  in  1987.
2  - Test of  the seniority hypothesis
A  simple  test  of  the  seniority  hypothesis  amounts  to  analyzing
the  significancy  of  the  composition  (among  private  and  public
creditors)  of  the  total  debt  on  the  price  of  the  commercial  debt.  Let
us  call  Lpuddet  Governement  and  IFIs'claims  on  developping  countries.
The  results are  given in equation  (6).
LPFIN  =  2.748  +  4.93  OPEN  - 1.248  LDET2  - 0.23LPUDDET
(0.97)  (2.76)  (-3.40)  (-1.24)
- 0.26  RES85  +  1.48  TOT  +  45.7  G2  - 2.34  PER  -
(1.79)  (1.31)  (2.73)  (-3.59)
191.41 POL - 5.41  BUL - 2,38  D2 - 2.65  D3 - 2.30  D4  -
(-2.84)  (-5.27)  (-2.16)  (-2.53)  (-2.30)
1.11 D5 - 1.07 D6
(-1.16)  (-1.11)
R2  =  0.68
We  see  that  public debt  has  no  significant additionnal power (at
the  5% degree of  confidence). This  points to  the  view that the  pricing
of  the  debt  is  indifferent to  its  composition. If  more  IFIs  debt  does
not  depress  (when  holding the  aggregate level  constant) the  price  of
the  commercial  debt,  this  rejects  the  seniority hypothesis.  Indeed,
if  the  IFIs'  debt  were  senior,  then  -ceteris  paribus-  more  of  it
(holding the  agregate debt constant) would reduce the  share of  the  pie
that  the  commercial banks are  expecting to  get  and  should degress the
commercial  debt's  price.  (Now  it  may  also  be  the  case  that  two
conflicting effects are at  work. More IFIs  money may depress the price
of  the  commercial banks  on  the  one  hand,  but  it  can  also  raise  the
prospect of  growth of the  country so that,  at the end,  the banks would
get a lower slice of a larger pie).
3 - The price of African debt
Using equation (5), one can then estimate for each African country
what would have been the price of the debt, had the debt been quoted,
on grounds similar to other indebted countries. The results are shown
in Table A4.
We find a large spectrum of cases, ranging from a Bostwana  priced
essentially at par, to Uganda, priced below the threshold of 31 cents.
From these estimates, one  can then proceed to  calculate what would
the  debt  to  exprot ratio  for  which  the  discount could  be  limited  to
25%.  This  is  shown in  table 4.  For  Africa as  a  whole the  number is:
211%.
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We  have  attempt to  address,  from  three  different view points,  the
debt  sustainability question. We  unambiguously obtained that  the  debt
crisis  of  the  1980s played a  significant role  in  explaining the  growth
slowdown  of Latin America and Africa.
We  then attempted to  measure what could be  an appropriate debt-to-
export  target.  If  one  takes  a  "perpetuity" view  on  the  debt,  it  is
reasonrable  to  assess what  could  be  the  share of  a  country's  exports
that  have  to  be  foregone  if  the  country  was  to  service  it  debt
indefinitely.  One  get  that  African  country  should  denote  about  one
third  of  their  resources  to  servicing  the  debt.  This  is  about  three
times what the large debtor actually transferred in the eighties
In  order to  analyze what could be an appropriate write down of  the
debt,  we  then estimated an econometric evaluation of  African debt  and
investigated which write down would bring the price  the debt up  to  75
cents  in  the  dollar.  We  got  that  such  a  target  would yield a  debt  to
export ratio of  about 210  %.  This  is not far from the average value of
the  debt-to-export ratio  that  was  reached when  countries first  intered
into  the  debt  crisis  in  the  80's  ;  at  the  time  an  average  ratio  of
250%  was  the  threshold alone which  a  country's  debt  needed to  be
rescheduled.  Altogether  we  then  trust  that  a  debt  to  export  ratio
between 200 and 250% is a reasonable  target for debt forgiveness.
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Debt sustainability  and the risk of debt repudiation
The  analysis  of  the  risk  of  debt  repudiation has  been  brought  to
life  by  the  work  of  Eaton and  Gersovitz (1981).  Early  work  on  the
topic  also  include  Kharas  (1984),  Kletzer (1984),  Krugman  (1985),
Ozler  (1986)  and  Cohen  and  Sachs (1986).  One  can  read  the  useful
survey  by  Eaton,  Gersovitz and  Stiglitz (1986)  as  well  as  the  other
papers  in  the  special  issue  of  the  European Economic Review  (June
1986) for  an  overlook of  the  state of  the  theory in  1985. An  earlier
useful survey is McDonald (1982). More recently a  second generation of
models of  debt repudiation have applied the tools of  modern bargaining
theory  to  the  analysis  of  debt  rescheduling. The  pioneering  paper,
here,  is  Bulow  and  Rogoff (1989a).  Other early  papers  in  this  area
include O'Connell  (1988),  Eaton  (1989) and  Fernandez and  Rosenthal
(1988).
The  key  to  all  such  analyses is  to  determine the  determinants of
debt  repayment,  when taking account of  the  risk  of  debt  repudiation.
What kind  of  sanctions are  necessary to  induce a  country to  repay  its
debt'? What  are  of  the  lessons of  the  debt  crisis  of  the  1980's  for
assessing  their  empirical  magnitude? These  are  the  questions  that  I
would now want to adress.
For  simplicity  of  the  analysis,  let  us  assume that  the  country  is
inhabited by  a  representative  consumer who is endowed each period with
a  quantity (Qt)t,O of  the  numeraire. We assume that Qt  is a continuous
process  whose  present  discounted value  (at  world  interest  rates)  is
finite.  Let  us  start  by  assuming  that  the  country  (i.e.  its
representative agent) has a free access to the world financial market.
Let  us  take  the  utility  of  the  representative agent  to  be  of  the
following separable form
22co
(7)  U  =  Fe_at  u(C ) dt  with u(C)  - X
J  V  tt
0
i fx  * O and  u(C  t) =  Log Ct if  r  =0.
with A =  1-1/a and a-  the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution.
The agent's debt follows a law of motion
(8)  Dt =  r Dt  + Ct - Qt
and is subject to the transversality  condition:  lim  e-rt Dt  =  °
t- > o
The first order condition has the form
(9)  ct/Ct  [r-6]
so that three cases emerge.
1)  r  <  a,  the  country is  more  "impatient" than the  representative
investor in  the  world financial market.  In  that  case,  the  growth rate
of  consumption is  negative  and,  asymptotically, the  country  drives
itself  to  starvation by  accumulating an  external  debt  whose  services
eventually eats out the country's resources.
2) r  <  a
The  reverse  situation occurs. The  country is  more patient than  the
rest  of  the  world  and  -asymptotically- owns  the  entire  world.  The
assumption  that  the  country  is  "small"  with  respect  to  the  world
financial market  could  obviously not  be  maintained in  this  case.  It  is
a  case  that  we  shall  not  investigate here  since  -at  any  rate-  the
country is asymptotically  a creditor rather than a debtor.
233) r  =  6
This  is  the  threshold  case  when  the  country's  subjective discount
factor  coincides  with  the  world  rate  of  interest.  The  country  (i.e.,
again  its  representative  agent)  seeks  to  maintain  a  flat  pattern  of
consumption  over time.
The risk of debt repudiation
Let  us  now  assume that  the  country has  the  option of  repudiating
its  external  debt.  We  do  not  investigate,  here,  the  bargaining
implications of  debt  repudiation and  simply  assume that  the  country
defaults  whenever  the  level  of  welfare  that  it  would  reach  by
servicing  its  debt  goes  below  the  reservation level of  welfare  that  it
would  have  access  to  by  defaulting.  Let  us  now  describe  such  a
reservation level.
When a  country defaults, we  shall assume that  the  creditors cut  all
access of  the  country to  the  world financial market either as  a  debtor
or  as  a  creditor.  This  implies, in  particular,  that  the  country  cannot
accumulate  reserve  after  it  has  defaults.  This  is  an  important
restriction as  the  work by  Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) has  shown (see
below).  Second,  we  also  assume that  a  defaulting country  loses  a
fraction  A  of  its  income  so  that  its  post-default  pattern  of
consumption  is simply
(10)  Ct  =  (1-A) Qt
The  particular  case  A  =  0  is  of  interest  in  its  own  right  and
corresponds the  case  when the  creditors'  sanction against a  defaulting
debtor  amounts  to  imposing financial autarky  forever after  the  debtor
has  defaulted.  We  now  want  to  investigate what  is  the  equilibrium
pattern of consumption  under this threat of potential repudiation.
Let  us  call  Dt  the  credit  ceiling  that  the  creditor  will  have  to
impose on the country so as to avoid default.
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(11)  ut=  If  e5(t)  u[Qs(l-A)] ds
the  reservation  level  of  welfare  that  the  country  has  access  to  by
defaulting. Dt must be set so as to guarantee that
(12)  vt  0  UtU  t
in  which U  = f ea(s-t) u  [Cs] ds  measures  the  level  of  welfare
t
associated  with  "servicing"  the  debt.  In  order  to  characterize  Dt
(and  to  definie  more  specifically how  the  "service"  of  the  debt  is
optimally spread out by the creditors), we shall prove the following
ProQositio :
On  any  time  interval ]a,b[  on  which the  constraint (12)  binds,  the
country services Pt  =  A Qt to its creditors.
In  the  particular  case  when  A=O,  Proposition  1  shows  that  the
country  will  not  service its  debt on  those time  intervals during  which
it  is  rationed.  In  a  different  framework  (when  the  country  can
accumulate reserves after  it  has  defaulted) Bulow and  Rogoff  (1989b)
have  shown that  short  of  direct  sanctions (x=0)  a  country will  never
service  its  debt.  This  is  not  quite  what  proposition 1  shows.  In  the
framework that  we  analyze, it  can  indeed very  well be  the  case  that
the  country  will  decide  to  service  its  debt  on  those  time  intervals
when it  is  not  rationed (see below).  In  Bulow and  Rogoff's  analysis,
these  intervals  correspond  to  the  times  when  the  country  would
accumulate reserves.
25Proof - The proof of the Proposition is straightforward.  Assume that
f e  u[QS(1-A)I  ds  =  f  e6(t)  u[Cs  ds
t  t
on a time by interval la,bi.  Differentiating  both sides yields:
u [Qt(1-,A)]  =  u(Ct)
so that  Ct  =  Qt(1-A). QED.
Take  the  case  of  an  economy which  is  exogenously growing at  a
constant rate n  >  0  :Qt  =  Qo ent. If  6  >  r,  we know that the credit
ceiling  will  be  binding  one  day  or  the  other.  Indeed,  consumption
would  otherwise  fall  to  zero  while  the  productive  capacity  of  the
country would grow exponentially. For  any value of  A  <  1, defaulting
has  to  become a  superior option.  Conversely, when the  credit ceiling
starts  to  bind,  we  also  know  that  it  will bind  forever.  Indeed,  given
the  homogeneity of  the  utility  function  it  is  straightforward to  show
that  the  credit  ceiling  constraint  is  simnply  growing  exponentially at
the  rate  n.  We  can  then  simply  characterize the  credit  ceiling  Dt
through equation (13) and get
A Q
(13')  Dt  =  r  - n
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28TABLE Al:  CAUSES OF  GROWTH SLOWDOWN  (in  %)
Worlwide Structural Investment  Terms of  Debt  Residual Total Effect
effects  tr a de
Burkina Faso  -0.27  +0.05  +0.60  +0.17  - -2.13  - 1.59
Cameroun  -0.27  -0.11  +0.53  -1.16  -0.39  -10.28  -11.69
Centre
Afrique  -0.27  +0.16  +0.37  -0.65  -0.79  +  1.29  +  0.12
Cote
d'Ivoire  -0.27  +0.38  -0.94  -0.94  -1.97  - 0.90  - 4.64
Ghana  -0.27  -0.84  -0.19  -1.03  +0.39  +  3.81  +  1.87
Kenya  -0.27  +0.28  -0.48  -0.59  - +  1.11  +  0.05
Malawi  -0.27  -0.17  -0.98  +0.24  -1.18  - 2.27  - 4.64
Mauritania  -0.27  +0.45  -0.09  +0.19  -1.97  +  1.09  - 0.60
Mauritius  -0.27  +0.38  -0.23  +1.32  - +  3.09  +  4.30
Worldwide  Structural  Investment  Terms of  Debt  Residual  Total
effects  t r ade
Nigeria  -0.27  +0.67  -1.27  -0.98  -1.97  +4.32  +0.50
Rwanda  -0.27  +0.45  +0.44  -1.18  - -7.98  -8.53
South
Africa  -0.27  +0.38  -0.29  -3.92  - +2.92  -1.18
Tanzania  -0.27  +40.38  -0.05  -0.25  +0.39  +3.96  +4.17
Zaire  -0.27  +0.20  +0.71  -0.07  - +1.60  +2.17
Zambia  -0.27  +0.43  -1.38  +0.73  -1.18  +2.94  +1.27
Zimbabwe  -0.27  -0.11  -0.43  +0.08  - +3.02  +2.29
29Worldwide  Structural  Investment Terms of  Debt  Residual Total
effects  t r ade
Benin  -0.27  +0.19  -0.23  -0.50  -0.54  +0.35  -1.01
Burundi  -0.27  -0.35  -0.30  +0.24  -0.39  -2.28  -3.36
Chad  -0.27  -0.36  -0.22  -1.93  -0.79  +8.87  +8.10
Gambia  -0.27  -0.08  -0.62  -0.52  -1.18  +2.14  -0.53
Guinee-
Bissau  -0.27  +2.62  -0.42  +0.17  -1.58  +9.71  10.22
Madagascar  -0.27  +0.32  -0.53  -0.54  -1.97  +4.05  +1.05
Mali  -0.27  -0.37  -0.03  +0.16  - +0.50  -0.01
Niger  -0.27  +0.56  -0.48  +0.44  -1.97  -2.68  -4.39
Togo  -0.27  -0.62  -0.27  +0.54  -1.18  -0.80  -2.60
30TABLE A2:  SOLVENCY  INDEX  AND  NET TRANSFERS  IN LATIN  AMERICA
b  =  (r-n)  DIQ (in  %)
85  - 88  89  - 93  Net  transfers
(1984-89)
Argentina  4.9  3.9  2.3
Belize  2.1  1.3  0.1
Bolivia  11.7  5.3  1.1
Brazil  2.1  3.7  2.4
Chile  3.4  1.8  2.8
Colombia  2.6  2.7
Costa Rica  7.5  4.3  3.7
Dominican
Republic  6.3  5.1  0.4
Ecuador  7.1  7.6  0.8
El Salvador  3.3  2.8  0.5
Guatemala  3.6  2.4  1.2
Guyana  41.0  33.0  4.8
Haiti  3.5  5.7  2.04
Honduras  5.4  6.0  1.5
Jamaica  10.3  7.0  1.42
Mexico  7.1  5.1  4.7
Nicaragua  31.3  36.6  -17.8
Panama  13.9  6.13  3.1
31TABLE  A2 (Sequel)
b  =  (r-n)D/Q
85  - 88 89  - 93 Net  transfers
(1986-89)
Paraguay  4.5  3.3  -0.50
Peru  4.9  10.6  -0.62
St-Lucia  0  1.0  -2.20
Trinidad
and Tobago  4.9  4.5  1.1
Uruguay  2.4  5.4  3.6
Venezuela  5.0  5.4  5.7
La t in~
America  10.4  7.1  -0.15
32TABLE  A3:  SOLVENCY INDEX  IN  AFRICA
1985-1993
b  =  (r-n)D/Q.(in  %)
Benin  5.8  Mali  8.1
Bostwana  1.2  Mauritania  16.5
Burkina  Mauritius  2.2
Faso  2.9
Burundi  8.0  Mozambique  22.6
Cameroon  6.1  Niger  6.9
Cape Verde  3.9  Nigeria  7.2
C e ntre  Rwanda  4.4
Afrique  5.9
Chad  4.1  Senegal  5.7
Comorros  6.7  Seychelles  2.7
Congo  16.3  Siena  13.7
Cote  d'Ivoire  17.7  Somalia  21.1
Gabon  5.3  Swaziland  2.4
Gambia  9.3  Tanzania  20.5
Ghana  4.8  Togo  10.0
Guinea  6.9  Uganda  5.6
Guinea Bissau  19.3  Zaire  10.9
Kenya  7.6  Zambia  18.4
Lesotho  4.6  Zimbabwe  5.2
Madagascar  13.9  Africa  9.0
Malawi  7.6
33TABLE A4
Estimated secondary market price
1988 1992  Debt to export  ratio
assoc iated to a  25% discount
Benin  0.52  0.59  1.64
Bosturina  0.98  0.99
Burkina
Faso  0.78  0.85  4.74
Burundi  0.38  0.34  2.72
Cameroon  0.68  0.62  1.80
Centre
Afrique  0.21  0.36  1.43
Chad  0.68  0.56  1.73
Cote d'Ivoire  0.08  0.05  0.33
Gambia  0.32  0.71  1.45
Ghana  0.40  0.64  2.69
Guinea  0.23  0.17  0.62
Guinea Bissau 0.09  0.06  2.33
Kenya  0.57  0.81  3.94
Madagascar  0.04  0.07  0.66
Malawi  0.32  0.62  2.62
Mali  0.39  0.33  1.71
Mauritania  0.08  0.39  1.69
Mauritius  0.96  0.99  5.39
Mauzambique 0.13  0.16  2.15
Niger  0.14  0.19  0.90
34TABLE A4 (sequel)
1988 1992  Debt to export  ratio
assoc iated to  a 25% discount
Niger  0.14  0.19  0.90
Nigeria  0.09  0.24  0.50
Rwanda  0.74  0.79  9.62
Senegal  0.16  0.22  0.48
Sierra
Leone  0.21  0.29  1.87
Tanzania  0.13  0.20  2.35
Togo  0.36  0.32  0.77
Uganda  0.53  0.10  1.56
Zambia  0.15  0.15  0.79
Zimbabwe  0.81  6.88  3.97
Africa  0.39  0.43  2.11
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